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BUILDING STRONG AND INDEPENDENT
JUDICIARIES THROUGH THE NEW LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT: BEHIND THE PARADOX
OF CONSENSUS PROGRAMS AND
PERPETUALLY DISAPPOINTING RESULTS
Bryant G. Garth
INTRODUCTION
The law and development movement of the 1990s has gone well
beyond its immediate predecessor of the 1960s and 1970s.1 There is a
much greater consensus in support of the programs today than in the
earlier period. The ideal of a strong and independent judiciary is ac-
cepted almost unanimously in development circles. Resources and in-
stitutional support have multiplied tremendously. This reflects the
fact that law and development programs are now at the forefront of
the agendas of development agencies in the United States and Eu-
rope, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
State Department, the American Bar Association, and even the U.S.
Supreme Court.2 There is now a rather large rule-of-law industry
ready to compete for the ever-expanding grant money to promote
"best practices" into the various "hot spots" of the world. Judicial
reform is at the heart of today's foreign aid programs.3
1. This article draws extensively on our recent book, YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH.
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST 1-0
TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (Univ. of Chi. Press 2002), and GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS:
THE PRODUCTION. EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Yves
Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds.. Univ. of Mich. Press 2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL
PRESCRIPTIONS].
2. Useful recent analyses of the new law and development include Jacques deLisle. Lex Amer-
icana? United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-
Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179 (1999): Tom Ginsburg, Does
Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 829
(2000): Carol V. Rose, The 'New' Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold War Era: A
Vietnam Case Study, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 93 (1998): Joseph R. Thome, Heading South but
Looking North: Globalization and Law Reform in Latin America, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 691. For
the activities of the World Bank, see WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE
STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD (Oxford University Press 1997): WORLD BANK. BEYOND THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: INSTITUTIONS MATEVER (1998): WORLD BANK. COMPREHENSIVE LE-
GAL & JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT (Rudolph V. Puymbroeck ed., 2001).
3. The CEELI (Central and East European Law Initiative) Program of the American Bar
Association has recently developed a Judicial Reform Index to measure what the ABA deems to
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All this activity, however, comes with a strong current of disap-
pointment. 4 We are trying hard, but the results are not what we had
hoped. So far this disappointment is attributed mainly to the relative
immaturity of the field, implying that we need more practice and more
learning. The lack of success is also attributed frequently to a lack of
political will, requiring more "stakeholders" in the judiciary or gov-
ernment, more monitoring and pressure from "civil society," or it may
be that training programs need strengthening. Despite all these sug-
gestions for improvement, however, we continue to face the paradox
of an apparently strong consensus in the north and in the south in
favor of reform, on the one hand, and disappointment with the rela-
tive lack of success so far, on the other. The task in this Article is to
get behind the paradox to examine the local and transnational
processes that help produce and explain it. Drawing on research that
Yves Dezalay and I have recently published in book form,5 I shall
begin by revisiting the first law and development movement to see
what we can learn from it.
II. CONTRASTING THE OLD AND THE NEW LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENTS
The earlier effort, chronicled best for Latin America but strongly
evident in Africa and Asia, sought to align lawyers with the program
of economic development led by strong states and designed by econo-
be the key indicators of judicial reform. CEELI, JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR ALBANIA (ABA/
CEELI Dec. 2001).
4. On both the activity and the general disappointment found in all these citations, see
THOMAS CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF ROMANIA (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace 1996); THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE
LEARNING CURVE (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace 1999): LYNN HAMMERGREN. THE
POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COM-
PARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Westview 1998): LYNN HAMMERGREN. Do JUDICIAL COUNCILS FUR-
THER JiUDICIAL REFORM? LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l
Peace, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 28. 2002):
JOHN HEWKO, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: DOES THE RULE OF LAW MATIER? (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Working
Paper No. 6. 2002): LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS/VENEZUELA PROGRAM FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION AND ACTION. HALFWAY TO REFORM: THE WORLD BANK AND THE
VENEZUELAN JUSTICE SYSTEM (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1996) [hereinafter
HALFWAY T"o REFORM], LAWYERS COMMIFEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BUILDING ON QUICKSANI):
THE COLLAPSE OF THF WORLD BANK'S JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN PERU (Lawyers Commit-
tee for Human Rights 2000) [hereinafter BUILDING ON QUICKSAND]; Mathew Stephenson, A
Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored 'Rule of Law,"
Reform Projects in the People's Republic of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64 (2000). The
World Bank has over three hundred rule-of-law projects. Id.
5. DEZALAY & GARTH. supra note 1.
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mists. 6 The leaders of development programs in government, the
United Nations and the major foundations, saw lawyers as obstacles to
development, too tied to a generalist expertise and conservative ideol-
ogy to play an active role. Wanting, nevertheless, to keep alive the
traditional role of lawyers in state leadership, the new programs from
the United States sought to retrain, technically upgrade, and reorient
a new generation toward the high profile and instrumentally prag-
matic approaches of U.S. corporate lawyers. The focus was therefore
on legal education-seeking to promote the critical thinking believed
to come from the case method-and on expertise in business law.
The death of this first law and development movement was has-
tened and chronicled in the mid-1970s by scholars who used their in-
sights to produce a more critical examination of the assumptions and
methods of legal reformers. 7 Both critical legal studies and "law in
context" owe something to these critical insights.8 The critics showed
that the approaches were rooted in a particularly U.S. approach to
law, which David Trubek and Marc Galanter labeled as "liberal legal-
ism," 9 that the effort to export the model was therefore "imperial,"
that the reform of legal education at the heart of the program essen-
tially failed, and that the improved technical training of a small cohort
of lawyers was not enough to effect positive change. Indeed, the tech-
nical skills and instrumental approaches could be used to serve au-
thoritarian governments and not the rule of law. More generally, the
critical scholars suggested that legal programs had to be understood in
the broader context of state power and the maintenance of the hierar-
chies associated with that power.
The setting for today's law and development is quite different. As
suggested above, the consensus is far stronger in favor of reform and
the legal approaches identified with the United States, including the
core idea of a strong and independent judiciary. Lawyers do not have
to fight for their role this time. Economists have come to see the im-
portance of legal institutions to the markets that they now promote.' 0
6. See JAMES GARDNER. LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN
LATIN AMERICA (Univ. of Wis. Press 1980) [hereinafter LEGAl IMPERIALISM]: JENNIFER WID-
NER. BUILDING THE RuLE OF LAW (W.W. Norton & Co. 2001).
7. The most famous account was in David Trubek & Marc Galanter. Scholars in Seif-estrange-
,nent: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States. 1974
Wis. L. REV. 1062.
8. See Brian Z. Tamanaha. The Lessons of Law-and- Development Studies. 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
470 (1995): WILLIAM TWINING. LAW IN CONTEXT: ENLARGING A DISCIPLINE (Oxford Univ.
Press 1997).
9. See Trubek & Galanter. supra note 7.
10. DANIEL KAUFMANN. MISRULE OF LAsv: DOES THE EVIDENCE CHALLENGE CONVENTIONS
IN JUDICIARY AND LEGAL REFORMS (World Bank First Discussion Draft 2001): KATHARINA
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Political scientists see the rule of law and independent judiciaries as
key components of "transitions to democracy" and even to the pro-
duction of "norms" central to international relations.11 These exper-
tises are embedded in the key development institutions including,
most importantly, the World Bank and the IMF. It is instructive that
both Robert Rubin and Jeffrey Sachs emphasized that the Asian crisis
of 1998 should be interpreted as a call for a new emphasis on the rule
of law versus "crony capitalism." Perhaps more importantly, there are
other economic and social pressures behind the new push for legal
institutional reform.
We can divide these pressures into two parts. The first draws on
economic or business imperatives.1 2 The series of events that began in
the 1970s with the oil crisis, which includes the subsequent recycling of
petro and then euro dollars into third world debt and financial deregu-
lation; the debt crisis of the 1980s; the subsequent wave of neo-liberal
reforms through structural adjustment and otherwise; privatizations;
and the multiplication of "emerging markets" linked to the capital
markets in London and especially New York, all came with a prolifer-
ation of professional service providers with increasingly global claims.
Corporate law firms, investment banks, management consulting com-
panies, and the "Big Five" accounting firms have all gone increasingly
global, advising businesses and the states that govern them how to
conform to the new rules of the game. All are part of a U.S. model of
legal-financial dealing and U.S.-style contracts, documentation of
deals, requirements for listing on U.S. stock exchanges, and intellec-
tual property. Moreover, they are reinforced by the high prestige of
U.S. MBAs and law degrees that instill the new rules in new genera-
tions of business and government leaders. These powerful producers
of ideas and approaches create a remarkable pressure for legal
convergence.
PISTOR. LAW AND FINANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES (Ctr. for Int'l Dev. at Harvard Univ.. L.
& Dev. Paper No. 4, 2000): FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE POLITICS AND INCENTIVES OF LEGAL
TRANSPLANTATION (Ctr. for Int'l Dev. at Harvard Univ.. L. & Dev. Paper No. 2, 2000) (address-
ing the economic literature but prepared by a lawyer).
11. See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell, Polvarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America: A
Partial Conclusion, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA
(Juan Mendez et al. eds.. Notre Dame Press 1999): Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, International
Human Rights Law in Practice: The Justice Cascade The Evolution and Impact of Human Rights
Trials in Latin America. 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
12. See, e.g., R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Globalization of American Law (paper
prepared for presentation NW. Univ. Dep't of Pol. Sci.. Apr. 19, 2001): Edward S. Cohen. The
Governance of Global Economic Activity: The Emerging Role of Private Law and Legal Agents
(paper prepared for meeting of the Research Section on the Structure and Organization of Gov-
ernance, IPSA, Univ. of Okla., Norman, Mar. 30-31. 2001).
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There is some resistance to this strong U.S. push. The recent wave
of business scandals in the United States, represented especially by
Enron, may undermine some of the credibility of the U.S. model. De-
nunciations of "crony capitalism," for example, cannot be made as
easily as in the past. The Wall Street Journal recently suggested that
the impact of the business scandals might be less in the stock market
than in the "marketplace of ideas, where the U.S. economic model is
coming under attack." 13 But the power of the business pressures re-
mains very strong. The emphasis on business pressures for the rule of
law is not likely to diminish much, if at all, in the coming years.
The second source of pressure is from the sector that Boaventura de
Sousa Santos calls the emancipatory pillar. 14 It includes a variety of
social actors including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
promoting human rights, environmental protection, nondiscrimina-
tion, and measures to counteract violence against women. Such pow-
erful institutions as the Ford Foundation and many others with similar
social agendas aid them.' 5
The two sides at times fight with each other and emphasize some-
what different approaches. We can see the fights, for example, in the
contests regarding environmental protection and the World Bank, and
in the work of NGOs opposed to the neo-liberal policies embedded in
the World Trade Organization (WTO).16 The contests, in fact, pro-
mote the construction of a competitive field sharing certain underlying
assumptions and approaches-especially the idea that strong and in-
dependent courts are essential for either side to succeed. This com-
petitive field allows strong debates, for example, between the World
Bank and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights about how to
promote judicial reform in Venezuela. As a result, it has pushed rule-
of-law issues into such high places in the policy world as the journal
Foreign Policy and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace.17 There are
scholars who have made their reputations and gained prestige for
their mastery of this field. Both sides are evident in the new focus of
the major foundations, the World Bank, the Asian Development
13. U.S. Loses Sparkle as Icon of Marketplace, WALL ST. J.. June 28, 2002, at A10.
14. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS. TOWARD) A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW. SCIENCE. AND
POLITICS IN THE NEW PARADIGMATIC TRANSIION (1995).
15. THE FORD FOUNDATION. MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW RELATED WORK OF FORD
FoUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD (Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub eds.,
2000).
16. See, e.g.. HALFWAY To REFORM. supra note 4: BuIl DIN; ON QUICKSAND, supra note 4.
17. Thomas Carothers has become a key figure here through his expertise in the rule of law.
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Bank, 8 and other development arenas on the issue of "good govern-
ance," even if the emphases vary enormously in the different places.
The field has even moved into country ratings for investment and
assessment of the quality of the bonds that support national debts.
Once again, there is no universal agreement on the ratings. The more
conservative ones, for example, highlight the efficiency of the Singa-
pore courts, while others might ask more questions about the room to
maneuver for NGOs with legal strategies. 19 But there is a field that all
tend to support, with debates about how the major institutions should
best approach legitimate reform efforts that include a commitment to
build strong and independent judiciaries. 20
At the same time, however, the literature reveals many doubts
about the efficacy of the reform efforts to date. As stated above, most
reflections on failure either cite a lack of political will or focus on ways
that subsequent efforts might learn from the mistakes of the past. The
lack of success has neither shaken the field nor diminished the enthu-
siasm for further efforts. In addition, the academic literature regard-
ing the processes of reform tends to participate in the consensus that
makes the movement toward better judiciaries seem both necessary
and inevitable. For example, the political science literature on "advo-
cacy networks" highlights the agreement among experts and moral en-
trepreneurs on norms that lead toward legal strategies for
enforcement. Similarly, the literature on the "judicialization of polit-
ics" suggests that more prominent judiciaries can be expected as a fea-
ture of modern political life. A few naysayers complain about a
repeat of legal imperialism, but they have trouble gaining adherents
given the degree of enthusiasm for these programs in the south as well
as the north and with the idealists as well as the realists.
18. Note the interest behind the very large study published as KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP
A. WELLONS. THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT, 1960-1995 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
19. Compare Ross Worthington. Between Hermes and Themis: An Empirical Study of the
Contemporary Judiciary in Singapore, 28 J.L. Soc'y 490 (2001), with Karen Blochlinger, Primus
Inter Pares: Is the Singapore Judiciary First Among Equals?. 9 PAC. RIM. L. & POLY J. 591
(2000). See generally Kanishka Jayasuriya. The Exception Becomes the Norm: Law and Regimes
of Exception in East Asia, 2 U. HAW. ASIAN PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 108 (2001).
20. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website reports, for example. on the
first "Rule of Law Roundtable," held on September 5, 2001, at www.ceip.org/files/events/
events.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2002). According to the summary, Frank Upham of NYU criti-
cized "a new conventional wisdom in development circles, the belief that formalist rule of law,
which stresses institutional legal mechanisms and absolute autonomy from politics, is a necessity
for economic development." Thomas Carothers was the moderator and Rick Messick of the
World Bank the commentator.
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III. FINDING A POSITION FROM WHICH TO ASSESS THE
NEW MOVEMENT
It is tempting for legal academics, in particular, to take a position in
favor of emancipatory judicial reform, to side with the Supreme Court
judges abroad who seem to be taking progressive stands on social is-
sues, or to participate in efforts to overcome the problems standing in
the way of reform-including the somewhat vague problem of "lack
of political will." The problem then tends to be one of finding the
"enlightened" local reformers-those who see the necessity of judicial
reform-and using the resources of various northern entities (devel-
opment organizations, the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, and
NGOs) to strengthen the reformist position with institutional lever-
age, resources, expertise, and legitimacy. For those who need other
motivations to support the programs, we can note that legal academics
that speak the right language can also count on consulting opportuni-
ties that will supplement their incomes, build their own networks, and
give them greater expertise about these issues.
It is important, however, to develop a critical perspective on these
processes and the consensus they support. 21 Therefore, we have
sought in two recent books to develop tools to understand the
processes that lead to these reform efforts, to explain why the efforts
mostly fail, and to understand why we tend to forget the lessons of the
first wave of law and development. One of our books explores the
"global prescriptions" that we see as a "new legal orthodoxy" pro-
duced in the north, mainly the United States, and exported to the
south.22 The other book seeks to apply two conceptual tools that are
at the core of the processes that have produced the new law and de-
velopment and, more generally, transformations in Latin American
states-in our book Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico-from what
scholars labeled "developmental states," characterized by heavy state
involvement in the economy, toward "neo-liberal states" with more
open and market-oriented economies. 23 The tools provide a way to
trace the actors who produce the pressures for change and invest lo-
cally in implementing that change, including judicial reform. Our
book, therefore, organized more than three hundred interviews into a
loose framework defined by "palace wars" and "international
strategies."
21. See also Stephenson, supra note 4: Maxwell 0. Chibundu. Globalizing the Rule of Law:
Some Thoughts at and on the Periphery, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 79 (1999).
22. GLOBAL PRESCRIVIrIONS. supra note 1.
23. The following draws mainly from DEZALAY & GART-i, supra note 1.
20021
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Before explaining our core concepts, it may be important to say
something more about the sociological approach we use and to con-
trast it with the more common academic approaches. The usual ap-
proach, especially in political science or economics, is to ask about
individual preferences, or elite preferences for particular social poli-
cies. This approach has the virtue of looking at the actors involved in
the importation and exportation of ideas and expertise. From this
perspective, critics can then celebrate or condemn the remarkable
convergence we find in favor of judicial reform. The legal analogue,
which places even more emphasis on individual agency, is to look for
what we consider the best social policy and then to support legal poli-
cies that will best bring them to fruition. Within law schools there is
also a strong tendency to align, at least symbolically, with those who
will promote the ideals we favor as public interest law. In one form or
another, all these approaches emphasize idealism and individual
agency.
Our approach, which draws on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu,
tries to move an additional step. It seeks to root that agency in the
particular structures and hierarchies that individual actors face.
Through the accumulation of numerous individual biographies, we be-
gin to understand the structures that interact with individuals en-
dowed with various kinds of actual and symbolic capital to produce
preferences for particular policies for a given time and place (or, for
example, to produce idealistic behavior). Bourdieu uses the term
"strategy" to characterize the way individuals navigate the "games"
whose rules they more or less understand. It is important, however, to
recognize that strategies in this sense are not necessarily characterized
by plans or even instrumental behavior. Strategies are structured
choices to survive and perhaps succeed in particular settings, and they
are both cooperative and competitive, depending on the position and
disposition of the actor.
IV. THE QUEST FOR STRONG AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIARIES IN
THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES AND
LOCAL PALACE WARS
International strategies are characterized by actions to gain power
locally through international resources, degrees, connections, and ex-
pertise. At times, such strategies are matters of course for an elite
that internalizes the notion that their education (and implicitly their
claim to social superiority) depends on the foreign degree. For the
period we study in Latin America, the more typical story is of an elite
individual without a clear path to local power, seeking consciously or
390
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unconsciously to get ahead locally through an international strategy.
Until quite recently, perhaps twenty or thirty years ago, a lawyer in
Latin America would gain very little realizable local capital from a law
degree from the United States. Within a world where "gentlemen
lawyers" oriented toward the European continent dominated the
state, it made no sense to get a worthless degree (although of course a
few did and later reaped dividends when the value of the degree
increased).
In contrast, those who invested in economics-often those who did
not have the familial connections necessary for success in law-gravi-
tated very early to the United States and used the prestige of mathe-
matical economics to gain status at home, both as economists and as
possessors of an expertise that could be used to discredit the generalist
lawyers. We cannot tell the larger story here, but after the U.S.-ori-
ented economists gained power and invested their neo-liberal ideas
locally, the value of the complementary legal education gradually in-
creased. It gained further momentum through the U.S. orientation of
the human rights movement that attacked the authoritarian states that
the economists served. Democracy came and the leading actors, econ-
omists but also a new generation of law graduates, were labeled as
"technopols" to emphasize their technical superiority to the gentle-
men lawyers. 24 The lawyers came back to a larger share of power by
changing their orientation and upgrading their technical abilities to-
ward U.S.-style legal practice. It is not surprising that these lawyers,
educated in the United States and using the claim of expertise and
legitimacy to gain power locally, support and invest in the U.S. con-
ception of the role of the judiciary. In interviews about the courts in
Argentina or Chile, for example, it was not unusual to hear a diagno-
sis of problems and solutions according to the authority of a Yale Law
Professor.
But the juxtaposition of the "technopols" representing the U.S.
team versus the old European-oriented gentlemen is too simple. The
single story neglects the fact that the local situations that produced
elite actors with the U.S. orientations in law are in many respects
quite different, and there are also differences in the local structures as
they relate to different expertises and approaches from the north. To
simplify a complex story, economic approaches from the north were
invested relatively successfully into the countries that we studied. An
important reason for this success was that economics was relatively
24. See JORGE DOMtNGuEZ. TECHNOPOLS: FREEING POLITICS AND MARKETS IN LATIN
AMERICA IN THE 1990s (Penn. State Univ. Press 1997).
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new as an academic discipline in the south. New institutions could be
created to build economic science and direct it into key institutions
with relative autonomy, such as central banks. Since colonial times, in
contrast, the law schools and the courts have been built into the fabric
of state power. Part-time law professors, including judges and mem-
bers of the political and economic elite, have managed to occupy the
key positions of power in the state, but their power comes from being
above the law, not from investing in the autonomy of the law or the
courts. Reforms that threaten their positions have understandably
faced very serious obstacles. More precisely, those who gain local
stature, even as "technopols" oriented toward the United States, tend
naturally to invest that stature into the established career patterns of
the political elite. Interestingly, however, within the law, the corpo-
rate law firm has been relatively more successful than efforts for judi-
cial reform, and public interest firms through the human rights
movement enjoyed some success until the authoritarian regimes were
toppled. At that point, however, those who had invested in human
rights tended to go into party politics.
From the perspectives of the different countries, the position of the
courts in Argentina and Mexico has traditionally been weaker than in
Chile and Brazil, although this is a question of relative weakness.
None of these cases can be seen as great successes, but clearly the
structures of power in Mexico and Argentina are not kind to judicial
reform. In Argentina, the violence of political struggle has left very
little room for investment in the autonomy of the law. Judges are first
and foremost members of political parties chosen for their ability to
reward their political friends and punish their political enemies. Each
new regime transforms the judiciary-and indeed the entire state ap-
paratus including the public law school leadership-in accordance
with this political warfare. In Mexico, the pattern established by the
long dominance of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
party meant that judges were first and foremost beholden to the party.
The judiciary was a place for PRI politicians with relatively little talent
or prospects for a place in the government. The judiciary thus repre-
sented a relatively unimportant, but not neglected, component of the
PRI patronage system, designed to bolster PRI power and legitimacy
and responsive to each six-year change in administration.
Those who continue to seek to invest in the autonomy of the law as
a career strategy in Mexico and Argentina tend therefore to leave the
judiciary. The local returns to such an investment, especially in Ar-
gentina and Mexico, although for different reasons, remain very low
within the judicial branch. In Mexico, interestingly, returns have been
[Vol. 52:383
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higher in new state institutions within and around the PRI (i.e., electo-
ral commissions and the human rights ombudsman). In Argentina,
the returns have been higher in the new private law schools, in think-
tanks located around, but not in, the state and in alternative dispute
resolution-mandatory mediation-located outside the ordinary
courts.
None of these observations, therefore, is meant to suggest that the
new law and development, including the efforts at judicial reform, has
no impact. Sustained investment over time would have a greater im-
pact. The first law and development movement, for example, left a
legacy in Brazil of corporate lawyers with an expertise in U.S. corpo-
rate law and good connections to U.S. lawyers. The relatively scarce
expertise they possessed became more valuable as the economy
changed. If we trace the careers of this group, we find remarkable
success in corporate law, the state, and the financial sector. These in-
dividuals led the movement to rewrite laws to conform to U.S. stan-
dards in, among other places, securities and intellectual property. The
U.S. investment paid off both locally and for the United States. What
did not happen, however, was substantial reform of the judiciary or
reform of legal education. The results of the international strategies
will depend always on a complex mix of northern prestige and pres-
sure, including the pressure of mentors and former professors, cou-
pled with the opportunities presented in local structures of power to
gain returns on those investments.
Despite all the problems and difficulties, one might still conclude
that the key is really making a sustained commitment to the good lo-
cal team, holding them to their promises, and making sure that the
investment does not get derailed. Certainly, this strategy requires
considerable local expertise and monitoring. It requires a deeper local
knowledge than simply a commitment to an independent judiciary
pursued through the consultants' general strategy of taking the "best
practices" from one client and moving them to another. There are
other issues, however, that are brought out by our research.
V. MORE GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE MOVEMENT TO
BUILD STRONG AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIARIES:
PALACE WARS IN THE NORTH
One problem is simply that the message from the north changes
over time. We have a very strong consensus in the academy today, but
it is relatively recent in origin. Most importantly, it is the result of
palace wars in the United States. Let us first go back to the earlier
law and development movement. The loudly proclaimed failure of
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the first law and development movement could be attributed to the
lack of success in realizing the ostensible goals. What is missing, how-
ever, is the other half of the equation found in the north. James Gard-
ner's Legal Imperialism seems to be a kind of mea culpa statement by
a former Ford Foundation official admitting the flawed and imperial
assumptions of the effort to export the U.S.-style rule of law to Latin
America.2 5 Missing, however, are the debates that took place within
the Ford Foundation in the United States about its more general pro-
grams in law. As the Ford Foundation moved further into legal strate-
gies consistent with the civil rights movement in the United States, the
emphasis shifted to public interest law. Those favoring the new public
interest law in the United States found themselves in opposition to
programs investing in corporate law in the service of Latin American
states. Legal Imperialism, while published after the struggle had en-
ded in the Ford Foundation, was part of a struggle within the United
States, in particular, within the then-liberal establishment, about what
role law should play in the state and state reform. 26 When the ap-
proach changed in the United States, it also changed in Latin
America. When the Ford Foundation picked up law again in Latin
America, it was to invest in the development of a human rights move-
ment consistent with northern strategies against Nixon and others who
threatened the liberal reformist establishment at home and abroad.
The revival of law and development came again from a conjunction
of northern and southern strategies. As the human rights movement
gained power in the 1980s as a tool directed against President Ronald
Reagan and Jeanne Kirkpatrick and their policy favoring authorita-
rian states in a renewed Cold War, the inability to account for the
murder of Roman Catholic nuns in El Salvador pulled the administra-
tion back into the business of judicial reform. They needed to build
institutions in El Salvador that would provide a credible investigation
and prosecution. Interestingly, according to Thomas Carothers,
before committing to the start of a new era of U.S. investment abroad
in judicial and legal reform, the lawyers solemnly read Gardner's Le-
gal Imperialism and vowed not to impose U.S. models where they
were not appropriate;2 7 this time would be different.
The push toward judicial reform also came from another side. Af-
ter the economists had taken power with Reagan through their attack
25. See LEGAL IMPERIALISM. supra note 6.
26. See also Tamanaha, supra note 8. Stephenson's description of the rule-of-law programs in
China also emphasizes the relationship to U.S. domestic politics. See Stephenson. supra note 4.
27. THOMAS CAROTHERS. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN
AMERICA IN THE REAGAN YEARS (1993).
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on the state, they were far more willing to invest in law and legal insti-
tutions to preserve and legitimize their policies and position in the
state. When President Bill Clinton came to power, determined to pre-
serve the economic policies of his immediate predecessors, the logic of
legal investment in legitimacy gained further. Again, this change in
the north came with the realization, or willingness to recognize, that
economic reform in the former Communist states was failing without
investment in the state and the law. The economics profession shifted
the center of gravity from anti-state policies to investment in institu-
tions to support markets and the neo-liberal policies of the 1980s. 28
Our description of the palace wars in the north is necessarily quite
sketchy here and somewhat misleading. It is not just that the policies
exported from the north and imported in the south reflect a northern
consensus. It is that the palace wars are exported. Outside of state
power in the 1950s and 1960s, Chicago's economists invested in train-
ing Chileans and getting them to try to demonstrate that monetarism
could control inflation. The investment in the south was part of the
struggle for power in the north. When the reformist establishment
was pushed out of power by the division over Vietnam and the subse-
quent election of President Richard Nixon, they invested in human
rights in Chile and Argentina as a strategy to gain power in the United
States. Lawyers, political scientists, and institutional economists used
the crisis in the former Communist states to claim a place with the
neo-liberal economists in the United States. Civil rights activists out
of favor in the United States in the 1980s as "rent seekers" similarly
sought to keep their profile and power by reconverting to interna-
tional human rights activities that might later be reinvested back into
the United States.
Given these processes, we certainly should not count on a sustained
investment in judicial reform in the south. The struggles for power in
the north will lead to more or less investment in law according to fac-
tors that have very little to do with what actually happens with that
investment. The current war against terrorism, indeed, may bring to
the forefront the same Cold Warriors who supported authoritarian
states because they were anti-Communist, putting the investment in
law and legal institutions again on the defensive. The point, however,
is not the specifics, but rather that the process is a hegemonic one that
focuses the business of exporting and importing on debates and issues
28. The change can be documented by looking at the evolution of the World Bank's annual
world development reports. The 1997 report, "The State in a Changing World," signals the
change.
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that have salience in the north (here the United States) at a particular
time and place. We export our own palace wars.
VI. THE PHENOMENON OF HALF-FAILED OR
HALF-SUCCESSFUL REFORMS
The importing side plays into this process of half-failed (or half-
successful) reforms. The importers, as we have noted, tend to come
from a cosmopolitan elite, capable of taking advantage of study
abroad, particularly in the United States. The power and legitimacy of
this elite comes in large part from its claim not just to privileged back-
grounds and connections but rather their possession of state-of-the-art
technologies of governance. At one time, the state-of-the-art technol-
ogies came from the European continent, but today they tend to come
much more from the United States. The general phenomenon, how-
ever, is the same. These leaders are not just purveyors of northern
ideas. They are embedded in structures of power with important in-
termediaries able to keep the social peace that allows the cosmopoli-
tan elite to maintain that elite status. There are accordingly complex
local arrangements with political parties, or even systems of patronage
and clientelism, that do not fit nicely into the terms of the imported
legitimating expertise.
One can hypothesize, therefore, that the importation of ideas and
approaches that have grown out of very specific contexts in Europe
and the United States will hit local limits. Some investment is neces-
sary to provide legitimacy both locally and internationally, but too
much investment might disrupt the social peace and the very local
structures and intermediaries that allow the cosmopolitan leaders to
maintain their positions.
This hypothesis helps to explain why there is a continuing logic of
half-failed transplants. Each generation must bring the latest technol-
ogies, now meaning a requirement for a strong and independent judi-
ciary, to fight against their predecessors and parents and at the same
time upgrade and relegitimize their governance. Within the north, at
the same time, critics and purveyors of new approaches will almost by
definition be able to say that the prevailing exported expertise has not
succeeded in transforming the local scene in accordance with the
hopes of the exporters. They will suggest that the approach and ex-
pertise they favor provides just the appropriate remedy for what ails
the south.
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A. Complications from the North-South Division of Labor
We have presented the problem of reform to promote strong and
independent judiciaries in largely comparative terms, but we must also
take into account a potential division of labor. The pre-eminence of
the institutions in the north takes some of the pressure off of the
south. Business disputes, for example, can be handled through inter-
national commercial arbitration operating according to the state-of-
the-art legal standards and involving at least a few representatives
from the south. 29 Major business disputes, in addition, can be im-
ported into the courts of the United States, fought through the WTO,
or handled through product liability laws enforced in the north.
The same is true for some of the activities that might push for more
investment in the autonomy of the courts. Thus, pressures on the ma-
jor faculties of law to reform are reduced by the fact that increasingly
the academic or professional degree that counts is the advanced de-
gree from the United States. Those who seek to invest in human
rights, similarly, can move into the major NGOs headquartered in
New York or Washington, D.C. In fact, they know that the northern
NGOs have the capacity to influence their own countries through the
leverage they can bring with the U.S. media, the U.S. government, and
crucial lenders such as the World Bank.
B. Potentially Competing Hegemonies
Another complicating factor is the potential of competing hegemo-
nies. We have presented our account as if the expertises exported
from the United States present the only game in town. Their global
reach is indeed very strong at this time not only in the south but also
in Asia and even in Europe. We must recognize that the power of our
expertises and approaches, consistent with our own state structures, is
always contested, and external factors-wars and revolutions, eco-
nomic crises, and the like-can shift the value of particular ap-
proaches rooted in particular national traditions. The United States in
1998 and 1999, aided especially by the IMF, had the authority to
blame the Asian crisis on "crony capitalism" and the lack of trans-
parency and the rule of law, but it is at least possible that the situation
could reverse.3 ° Recall that Japanese power a little more than a dec-
ade ago had scholars in the United States calling for an "industrial
29. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH. DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAl. ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUC-TION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (Univ.
of Chi. Press 1996).
30. See, e.g.. Robert Wade & Frank Veneroso. The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model Versus
the Wall Street- Treasurv-IMF Complex. 228 NEw LEFI REV. 3 (1998).
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policy." The long tradition of lawyers and courts in the United States
has so far ensured that law and legal approaches have never been too
far from the technologies of governance we favor, but even that could
change over time in relation to a radical shift in global power. More
likely, the ascendancy of other models could act as a local counter and
a legitimate alternative to today's consensus in favor of stronger legal
institutions.
C. Further Local Complexities: The Potentially Precarious
Position of Imported Expertises
The picture we have given is one of local cosmopolitan elites im-
porting the latest and most prestigious technologies for governing the
state and the economy into their own local contexts, with more or less
limited successes depending on the local situation and the power and
resources of those on the exporting side. The investment in a strong
and independent judiciary faces numerous obstacles, including the fact
that the investors on both sides may change their minds about the
priority of this feature of good government or be pushed aside by
others with different opinions or new cutting edge approaches. An-
other problem is simply the stability of the general system we have
described. Its legitimacy can be challenged, especially in an economic
or political crisis.
There are at least three vulnerabilities in terms of the legitimacy of
this imported expertise. The first, which we have not explored in de-
tail here, is that the asymmetrical importation of U.S. legal technology
may affect its legitimacy. The U.S. legal profession depends on the
idea that, while most of the best talent serves major corporations,
some proportion-including from within the corporate bar-will be
devoted to public interest law. In the countries we studied, the corpo-
rate part has been imported relatively successfully, but the other side
has not. If elite lawyers are perceived as only serving big businesses,
and of those, mainly foreign businesses, their position may not serve
well as a platform for promoting the rule of law-including a stronger
and more independent judiciary.
Second, there is the danger that the fact that the expertises are for-
eign will be used to attack and delegitimize them at particular mo-
ments. Furthermore, the recent wave of support for strong and
independent judiciaries has been accompanied by a transformation in
the role of the development agencies, including the World Bank. At
the time of the first law and development and before the conversion
of the development institutions to the virtues of "governance," the
World Bank, in particular, was forbidden by law to get involved in
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local political issues. The General Counsel was expected to keep the
Bank from intruding on the sovereignty of states that were supposed
to be able to choose their own political system. Through a combina-
tion of realism and idealism symbolized by the alliance of the environ-
mental movement with critics of the Bank such as Jesse Helms, the
obstacles to a more intrusive approach for good or evil have largely
been overcome. 31
The World Bank and the IMF, therefore, are far more involved in
local politics and political reform than they were in the 1970s and
1980s. Even structural adjustment in the first round did not involve
questions of how to best design the state and its institutions. It simply
called upon the state to follow certain economic recipes as a condition
of foreign aid. The intrusion now is much greater, potentially provok-
ing a reaction. Note in this context that the best way to promote judi-
cial reform from the north is to get involved in the micro-details of the
south.
Third, and finally, there is the situation of the cosmopolitan elite
linked to this imported legitimacy and expertise. While it has not hap-
pened yet, we can certainly imagine the development of radical strate-
gies to blame current economic and political problems on the elite and
on its dependency on the north for ideas and legitimacy. That is not to
say that strategies to attack these people or ideas will succeed, but it is
important to see that the entire edifice remains somewhat fragile.
VII. CONCLUSION
This contribution is not meant to denigrate the goal of strong and
independent judiciaries. It is not difficult to see from our perspective
the advantages that we understand to flow from judicial reform corre-
sponding to a U.S. model of state institutions and a corresponding role
for lawyers and the law. Indeed, our ability to see these advantages
reflects our inclusion in the processes that we seek to study. The echo
we find among our friends in Latin America and elsewhere reinforces
our comfort in the United States with the value of these approaches.
The purpose of this Article is to try to explain both the comfort and
the echo and to show why the prospects for the new law and develop-
ment may be no better than they were for the earlier version.
Hierarchies and structures of power provide incentives in the north
and south that have led to the new law and development. The consen-
31. See Robert Wade, Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment. 1970-1995, in
THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY: VOLUME 2 PERSPEC-IIVES (Devesh Kapur et al.
eds.. 1997).
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sus that sustains it and the impacts of such reform efforts, even if using
the same approaches with the same general agreement, will be very
different in different local settings. The similarities among the Latin
American countries mask substantial differences in the position of the
courts and their potential as relatively independent of the executive
and legislative parts of the government.
More fundamentally, the same hierarchies, structures, and corre-
sponding sets of incentives that have produced the pressures for re-
form may just as easily undermine the very same consensus and take
away those pressures. Not only can the consensus be challenged from
the top, as it was at the time of the first law and development, but it
can also be challenged from those who do not participate in the
processes behind the current consensus. Current economic crises, ex-
emplified especially by the Argentine crisis, so far have not produced
a strong vocabulary of resistance to the general contours of the U.S.-
legitimated-"dollarized"-model of development, but we must rec-
ognize that such a resistance, which could also question the role of the
courts that development agencies now support, could develop and
spread. The end of the Cold War has limited the production of alter-
native development models, but we very much doubt that we are at
the end of this particular history in the United States or elsewhere.
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